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A FRAMEWORK FOR REPARATIONS
CLAIMS
KEITH

N.

HYLTON*

Abstract: These remarks. prepared for the Boston College Third I'Vorld Law
Journal Reparations Synlposium,

compare

the goals and viability of

reparations claims as tort suits. I contrast two appiroaches observed in
the claims: a "cloing justice" model, which involves seeking compensation in important cases of ticorrectedl0tncompensated injustice,
atnd a "social welfare" model that seeks to change the distribution of
wealth. Claims under the first category are far more consistent with tort
doctrine and likely to meet their goals than social welfare-based claims.

INTRODUCTION

I am aware of two extant legal claims for reparations, the FarmerPaellman, v. FleetBoston1 case in New York and now the claim for compensation in Tttlsa, Oklahoma. 2 The FleetBoston complaint seeks compensatory damages, pnmfitive damages, restitution, and an accotmting
of profits from American slavery. The Tulsa complaint seeks compensation for victims whose relatives were killed and property destroyed by
angry white mobs that rioted though Tulsa's black comnmtnnity in 1921.3
My aim in this article is to compare different reparations claims
in terms of their goals and viability as tort stuits. I contrast two approaches observed in the claims: a "social welfare" model and a "doing jtustice" iodel. Part I of this article highlights the distinctions between these two al)proaches. Part II analyzes the potential of the
social welfare model 1))' drawing upon statistical data measturing rela" Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law. Boston University School of Law;
Boston, MA, 02215; knhs lton@bL.ectu. This paper was prepared for a conference on reparations at Boston College Law School, Mar. 14, 2003.
1 See generally Complaint & Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmannn. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp. (E.D.N.: 2002) (No. 02-CV-1862).
2 Sec Lyle Denniston, Lawyers Hope Tulsa Case Can La) Foundation for More Claims, BosTON (;LOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at A16.
3See id. (describing Professor Charles Ogletree's leadership of team that drafted complaint seeking compensation in Tulsa case); Tatsha Robertson, Quest for Vindication: Survivors of 1921 Tulsa Race Riots Hail Suit for Reparations, BosTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at Al.
See generally ALFRED L. BROPtIY, RECONsrTRUCTING TIlE DREAMLAND: Till TULSA RIOT OF
1921 (2002) (providing full historical treatment).
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tive poverty rates among black and white families in the United States.
Parts III and IV analyze the potential of both the social welfare model
and the justice model by setting up a tort-based framework in which
to determine the relative likelihood that these claims will prevail in
court. I conclude that reparations claims under the justice model are
far more consistent with tort doctrine and likely to meet their goals
than the social-welfare-based claims.
I. Two APPROACHES TO REPARATIONS CLAIMS: JUSTICE
VERSUS SOCIAL A,'XELFARE

Although both the FleetBolston and Tulsa complaints have been described as reparations claims, there are significant differences between
them. They reflect two distinct and in some vay-s conflicting policies
behind reparations litigation. One approach is driven in large part by
social welfare and distributional goals. The other approach is based on
'
a desire to correct historical injustices; simply to "do justice. '
The justice approach views reparations lawsuits as efforts to identify uncorrected or uncompensated cases of injustice, and to seek
"correction" in the Aristotelian sense of returning the parties to positions roughly similar to the pre-injury setting. This involves identifying
particular individuals or entities that committed bad acts and particular victims who were injured. Such correction also requires specifying
the precise acts that led to injury, and the sums necessary to compensate victims for the injuries. The Tulsa complaint fits this description.
The lawyers who filed the complaint have rounded up individuals
whose property was destroyed and whose relatives were killed or injured during the Tulsa riots. Another example tnder this category is
the class action suit brought against the federal government in 1973
for the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. 5 Yet another example is the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provides compensation for Japanese
4 This view of reparations claims brings them withih the class of recent crilmial trials
of former tlansman for murders committed in the 1960s. See Rick Bragg, Former Klansman
Is Found Guilty of 1966 Killing, N.Y. TiNIEs, Mar. 1, 2003, at A12 (reporting case of Ernest
Avants, a former Klansman found guilty by a jury, after only three hours of deliberation,
for the murder of Ben Chester White); Guilty Verdict in Church Bombing Trial, Online NewsHour, at htti://wwkW.l)bs.org/newshour/engenla_preview/updates/birmighal-05-0222.html (IMay 22, 2002) (describing conviction of former Klansman Bobby Frank Cherry
for mutder of four girls in 1963 bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church).
5 Starting in the 1930s, 399 syphilitic men signed up for free medical care from the
U.S. Public Health Service. They were never told that they had syphilis, oNly that they had
"bad blood." See SourLegacy of Tuskegee Syphilis Expenment Linges, CNN Interactive, at http:/
/www'w.cnn.coin/HEALTH/9705/16/nfim.tskegee/
(May 16, 1997).
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mnericans held in internment camps during World War 11.6 The statute compensates only direct victims-the individuals who were held in
internment camps.
In contrast to the justice approach, the social welfare approach
reflected in the FleetBoston complaint does not seek to dojustice in any
discrete case, but rather, aims for a significant redistribution of
wealth. The complaint names several existing corporations as defendants, such as FleetBoston (a bank) and CSX (a railroad), inchlding a
reference to one thousand "Corporate Does" as additional defendants. 7 So many businesses had a hand in slavery that the complaint
cotild just as well refer to ten thousand Corporate Does. The plaintiff,

Deadria Farmer-Paelhnann, sties on "behalf of herself and all other
persons similarly situated"-in other words, on behalf of all African
Amnericans whose ancestors were held as slaves in this country.8
This brief description of the Tulsa and FleetBoston complaints
should be sufficient to illustrate the differences between the social
welfare and justice approaclhes. There is nothing controversial about
doing justice; most lawsuits claim to have that principle at their core.
The social welfare apl)roach, however, is unusual in litigation. At the
heart of the FleecBoston suit is a belief that reparations litigation will
compensate or correct for years and years of inattention, or insufficient attention, to the welfare of African Americans. In short,
proponents hope that FlectBoston-like lawsuits will force through the
kind of broad redistribtmtion of resources toward poor black citizens
that might never be achieved through the political process.
The social welfare al)proach shares mitch in common with the recent wave of tobacco litigation and the lawsuits against gun com)anies.
The tobacco litigation, specifically the "Master Settlement Agree-nent"
between tobacco companies and litigating states, led to a large-scale
redistribution fi-om cigarette nantufacturers and their customers to
other groups in society. 9 That redistribution comlpensates society for
some of the "externalities- imposed by the cigarette industry and helps
to shrink its overall size. Many have argued that such a massive redistribution is socially desirable, and that Congress or state legistlatures
6 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000).
7 Complaint &Jury Trial Demand at 1. Farmer-Paclmann(No. 02-CV-1862).
8 See id.
9 See geneally

AVID IM. CUTLER ET A-., How Goon A DEAL \VAS TilE TOBACCO SETPAYMENTS -10 INIASSACHUSErrs (Natl Bureau of Econ. Reseatrch,

T1 ENIENTr? AVSSESSING

Working Paper No. 7747. 2000) (assessing payments to Massachusetts in tobacco settlement of 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.co/ papetafabstractid=23350.
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would have failed to achieve a similar result because tobacco companies
circulate enough money throughout government to block any),
significant move toward greater regulation or taxation. In the same
sense, proponents of FleetBoston-like reparations claims believe that
significant redistribution toward groups that make up America's underclass will not be achieved through legislative action. Thus, reparations proponents have turned toward the courts.
II.

STATISTICS AND THE SOCIAL W'VELFARE APPROACH

Perhaps the best way to get a sense of the potential of the social welfare approach is to start with a rexiew of where things stand in terms of
relative welfare levels. Table 1 shows the percentage of families living below the poverty line in the United States for the years 1959 to 1999. The
first two columns in the table compare poverty rates for black and white
families, including those not married (female-headed households). The
last two columns compare poverty rates for married families.
The statistics show that the poverty rate among black families fell
from nearly 50% in 1959 to 28% in 1969. It held steady at that level
for the next twenty years. The most recent year in Table 1, 1999,
shows the poverty rate for black families at 22%, a substantial decline
relative to the stagnation of the previous three decades.
Wf\hite families appear to have made substantial progress from 1959
to 1969; their poverty rate dropped from 15% to 8% during that period. After 1969, white famfilies made inconsistent progress for the next
twenty years. While the statistics for white families do not show the same
stagnation seen in the numbers for black families, the poverty rate at
the end of 1989 is the same as it was at the end of 1969. In 1999, we see
a significant drop in the white poverty rate down to almost 7%.
Table 1: Families Below Poverty Line in the United States'
Year
1959
1969
1979
1989
1999

% of Families
White
15.2
7.7
6.9
7.8
7.3

% of Families
Black
48.1
27.9
27.8
27.8
21.9

°

% of Families
White Married

% of Families
Black Married

4.7
5.0
4.4

13.2
11.8
7.1

10U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HIsTroRcAL POVERTY TABLES (1999), at http:// wv.censtts.
gov/hhbles/pov erty /histprov/histpov4.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
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Table 1 suggests a pessimistic outlook for the potential of social
welfare-based reparations litigation. The most aggressive period of redistrilbttional policy implemented by the federal government, 1969 to
1989,11 coincides with roughly twenty years of stagnation in the povert,
rate for black families. For those who believe in the transformational
potential of FleetBoston-like lawsuits, this is a disappointing fact.
Census data on poverty rates for married families became available much later, and so Table 1 shows figures only from 1979 to 1999.
These lata suggest some interesting observations. For both races, the
povertv rates are lower within the population of married families. The
decline appears to be mtich greater for black families, however. The
ratio of white married to general family poverty rates runs from a
high of 68% in 1979 to 60% in 1999. The ratio of black married to
general family poverty runs from 47% in 1979 to 32% in 1999.
The relative poverty rates of married families to general famfilies
suggest that most of the difference between black and white family
povert, rates can be explained by family structure-specifically, the
low rate of marriage among black families below the poverty line. Indeed, the 1999 Census data on poverty rates suggest that family structture has a significant influence on wealth. In 1999, the marriage rate
among white families below the poverty line was 82%.12 The marriage
rate among black families below the poverty line was 48%.13 The poverty rate among non-married white families was 20%.14 The poverty
rate among non-married black families was 36%.15 If black families
below the poverty line had the same marriage rate as white families
below the poverty line in 1999, the general black poverty rate would
be 12.3%,16 nearly half the 22% level reported for that year.

11Admittedl, the Civil Rights and Great Society legislation began (liring the mid1960s, but it is unlikely that they had much of an impact on relative wealth levels bs 1969.
Thus, the 1969-1989 period covered by the Censns data probably provides a reliable
measure of the effects of redistribittional policies.
12This is the ratio of the number of married-couple white families in the 1999 Censns
sampIe, 48,794, to the number of white families in the sample, 60,256. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, sUpIa note 10.
13 This is the ratio of the number of married-couple black families in the 1999 Census
sample, 4,144, to the number of black families in the sample, 8.664. See id.
141 fotInd this by using the relationship 7.3 = (1-.82) x + (.82)4.4, where x is the poverty

rate among non-married white families in 1999.
15I found this bI using the relationship 21.9 = (1-.48)y + (.48)7.1, where y is the povertN
rate among non-married black families in 1999.
16Ifpoor blacks had the same marriage rate as poor whites in 1999, the overall povert
rate would be given by (1-.82)36 + (.82)7.1 = 12.3.
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That the black poverty rate appears to be so largely influenced by
family structure has to be considered a discouraging piece of information for proponents of the social welfare model of reparations litigation. Reparations lawsuits simply cannot do much to change the marriage rate in poor black families.
Perhaps I have been unfair in my description of the social welfare
model. The goal of the FleelBoston suit may be to use the money collected from defendants to build social institutions that foster family
stability, enhancement of human capital, and the development of
businesses. If so, the social welfare based litigation may indeed lead to
a stbstantial dlrop in the black povert y rate. But this is a purely speculative argument. There would be a substantial lag between payout and
results if the real aim of the FleetBoston suit were to invest in the development of social capital. Also, there is nothing in the FleetBoston complaint that would lead one to believe that the aim of the lawsuit is to
fund social capital development.
III. A

FRAMEWORK FOR CLAIMS

Two features distinguish reparations claims from ordinary, runof-the-mill tort lawsuits. One is a credible assertion by the plaintiffs
that they faced an insurmountal)le legal barrier in the past preventing
them from seeking a remedy in the courts at the time of the initial
injury. This is true of both the Tulsa and FleetBoston complaints. Lynch
mobs initiated the Tulsa riots, claiming to be searching for a black
man accused of assaulting a white woman. In that period, when racist
lynchings were common, black residents of Tulsa would have rationall), assulmed that no court would seriously consider a lawsuit seeking
compensation for injuries caused by a lynch mob. In the FleetBoston
complaint, the claim of a legal barrier is more credible: slavery was
formally sanctioned by law until its abolition in 1865.
The second distinguishing feature of reparations claims is passage
of tine; the claims are typically brought long after relevant tort and
criminal statutes of limitations have passed. The passage of time problem presents several legal difficulties. First, there is the problem of
identification. The identities of the victims and injurers are hard to determine,'17 thougl the importance of this problem varies with the type

17 See Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in BREAKING TilE CvCLES O1 HATRED 107,
112-16 (Marth Minow ed. 2002) (discussing the problem of identification); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.YU. ANN. SURV. ANL
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of claim. The Tulsa complaint involves identifiable victims. Tile injurers in the Tulsa case are to some extent identifiable. Some of the vandals and killers are probably still alive, perhaps living quietly in Tulsa.
Further, if you accept plaintiffs' claims that the city and state governnents are partially responsible, which seems plausible when a group
launches a pogrom and goes unpunished by the state, then those entities still exist and can be sued. Nevertheless, the local and state governments have surely changed since the days of the Tulsa riots. Although they are formally the same entities that were in existence at
the time of the riots, they are vastly different from their predecessor
regimies in terms of the characteristics relevant to the lawsuit.
Identification is a much more serious problem in the FleetBoston
case. The named corporate defendants had no direct hand in the
slavery business; they are successors to businesses that once had a
hand in slavery. This raises the same problem we observe in the Tulsa
case btit in a more severe form. While the defendants in Tulsa are
formally the same entities that were in existence at the time of the
riots, though their characters have changed, the defendants in FleetBoston are not even formally the same entities. Moreover, the successot corporations named as defendants in FlectBoston probably bear little resemblance to their predecessor firms. Given that successor firms
are generally not liable for the torts of predecessor firms, this is a potentially important obstacle to plaintiffs.' 8 Successorship law makes
exceptions, forcing successors to assume the liabilities of predecessors
in special cases in which the successor has promised to assume those
liabilities or, at the least, has continued the same operations. 19 But the
successors in this case probably do not fall into either exception.
Perhaps the more troubling identification problelm in FlectBoston
is that it appears to be a matter of chance that some corporations have
been identified as successors. 20 One assumes there were many more
1L.497, 503-05 (2003) (same): MariJ. Matsuda. Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Repations, 22 H.AR'V. (C.R.-C.L. L . Ri,\. 323, 374-80 (1987) (same).
18 See Polis .. Clark Equip. Co., 8092 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Tle imposition of
sticcessor liability on a purchasbig company long after the transfer of assets defeats the
legitimate expectations the parties held dtnring negotiations and sale.").
19 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules. Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308-09 (3d Cih. 1985)
(recognizhig exceptions to the general rule of nonliability).
20 This version of the identification problem-inabilitv to get substantially all of the responsible injurers in court-has emerged as a barrier to market share liability claims. See.
e.g., Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 175 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting market share
liability claim in case of 100-phlis year-old house). Admittedly, the problem is different in
the slavery reparations context. In Skipworth. the fact that the plaintiff could not be sure
that he had joined the responsible defendant or defendants was a major flaw. Id. at 174.
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firms involved in slavery than the number that appear as named defendants on the FleetBoston complaint. Suppose the named defendants
(including the Corporate Does) were all held liable. Should their liability be capped, as in the market share liability cases, 1y their degree
2
of responsibility in creating the harm? '
The general identification problem on the part of plaintiffs in
the FleetBoston case is particularly severe. This is a well-known problem,
so I will not tax the reader vith a detailed account. Who are the descendants of the victims of slavery? What should be done about African Amrericans who cannot trace an unbroken blood line through
other descendants of slaves? Should an kfrican-American multimillionaire who can trace an unbroken blood line to slavery be considered within the plaintiff class?
The second problem connected to the passage of time is described as "causation" or "proximate cause" in the law. The law reqtires proof of a causal link between the plaintiff's injury claim and
the defendant's breach of the legal standard. I have explored this
problem elsewhere. 22 For now, it should be enough to say that it will
not be easy to prove that a particular plaintiff's position today is the
direct resut of slavery several generations ago.
The third problem connected to the passage of time is that of
prescription of legal fights. I refer to statutes of limitation. They exist in
part because of the reasons mentioned above-identification and
causation, both of which become difficult to prove as time passes.
They also exist because the deterrent effect of the law is likely to be
weak, relative to the cost of its implementation, as more time passes
between initial injury and enforcement of the law.
IR.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK

Looking at the identification problem alone, we can classify reparations complaints according to the scheme in Figure 1 below. The
Plaintiffs in the FleetBoston case are suing the successors of proper defendants, but their
levels of responsibility for harms to the plaintiff class differ greatly. Complaint &Jury Trial
Demand at 8-9, Farmer-Paellnann (No. 02-CV-1862). In addition, in most cases the link, in
terns of finances or business practices, between the soccessor and its pre-1865 predecessor
is tenuous.
21 See City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indtts. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 125-27 (discussing
judicial responses to market share liability).
22 See KEITH N. HYT ON, SLAVERY AN) TORI LAW 46-51, (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law,
Vorking Paper No. 03-02, 2003, Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper Collection)
(exploring the problem of causation and proximate cause), at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.ta-f..abstractid - 374200.
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columns describe categories of identifiable and non-identifiable injurers. The rows describe categories of identifiable and non-identifiable victims. So, for example, the first cell of Figure 1 contains
complaints involving identifiable injurers and victims.
Under the category of identifiable injirers, I have included cases
involving injurers who were actively responsible for the harms imposed on victims. For example, the Tuskegee syphilis experiments involved identifiable government departtnents. 23 I put the Tulsa coniplaint in the non-identifiable category because the only resl)onsible
parties identified so far are the local governments, who were passive.
Holocaust reparations claims belong in both the identifiable and
non-identifiable injmer categories. Claims against (Ihe German goverminent or against Swiss banks involve identifiable injurers who were
actively responsible, though again in the form of successor corporations. Holocaust claims also involve a potentially large number of passively responsible actors, which are difficult to identify. For example,
claims against manufacturers for selling technology or items that
aided the Nazi regime probably could be asserted against an indeterminable number of corporations. And then there is the Goldhagen
thesis, that most ordinary Germans were willing accomplices,2 4 wVhich
creates an even larger identification issue.
The only unexplained part of Figure 1 involves identifiable defendants and non-identifiable plaintiffs. The claims to communal land
by mterican Indians or Australian Aborigines are representative of
this type of reparations claim. The actively responsible injurer is easy
to identify. The victims, descendants of the initial group of dispossessed natives, are sometimes difficult to identify. Indeed, the issues
are equivalent to the ones that arise in determining where to group
the plaintiff class in the FleetBoston case.
Figure 1
It/A

Identifiable InjuLrC1rs

Non-identifiable Injurers

Identifiable
Victims

Tuskegee, Japanese interninent,
Holocaust, Tulsa (conspiracy theo )

Tulsa (passive theorT),
Holocaust

Non-identifiable Victiros

Comninal land claims (in United
States, Australia)

Fleet
Boston

23 In December 1974. the class action suit was settled for roughly $10 million, which
provided $37.500 to each of the survivig subjects of the study and smaller amounts to

other victims. Galanter. supra note 17. at 124 n.2.
.4 SCC gecrally DANIEIL JNA11 GOLHIA(.EN, HITLER'S Wit11.INC; EXECUTIONERS: ORDINAPR" c;LRNIANS & -IHE HOLOCAUST (1996).
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My point in setting lip this framework is to differentiate the types
of reparations claims in terms of their likelihood of prevailing in
court. The ability to identifT parties is a basic prerequisite for an), tort
suit seeking compensation for injuries. A tort plaintiff is unlikely to
collect damages if a court cannot be relatively sure that the defendant
he or she is suing is really the one who caused the plaintiff's injury;
the same is true if the court cannot be sure that the plaintiff is really
the one who suffered ant injury. The tort cases put this problem under
the general category of "factual causation." The oldest and most
widely accepted solution to the identification problem appeared in
Summers v. Tice, where the court shifted the burden of proof to two
hunters who both shot at the plaintiff at the same time, and only one
25
of them wounded the plaintiff.
In terms of identification, the Tuskegee case falls within the
strongest category of claims because both the victims and the actively
responsible injurers were identified. The Tulsa claim is almost as
strong, though its closeness to the Tuskegee case depends on the
plaintiffs' theory of liability. If the plaintiffs assert and produce
sufficient evidence to prove that the local and( state government defendants acted in conspiracy with leaders of the rioting mob, then the
Tilsa claim is essentially equivalent to the Tuskegee case. 26 If, however, the plaintiffs can show only that the local and state governments
were negligent, in the passive sense of not doing enough to prevent
the harm or punish the injurers, then the Tulsa claim is weaker than
the Tuskegee case because the Tulsa defendants would not be actively
responsible injurers. Still, even under this theory, it is arguably too
strict to put the Tulsa clain in the category of non-identifiable defendants. In terms of identification, the Tulsa complaint is much closer
to the Tuskegee case than to the FleetBoslon claim.
Though the Tulsa complaint is relatively close to the Tuskegee
case on identification grounds, and therefore a relatively strong case
25See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1,5 (Cal. 1948).
26 See First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Mexander v. Governor of State of Oklahoma
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (No. 03-CV-133) (-Defendants the GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
OKLAtOMA and the CITY OF TULSA conspired together and acted in concert with one
another throughout and after the Riot. The Defendants called out local units of the State
National Gtard and Ceputized white citizens of Tulsa, Oklahoma ('Tulsa'), who, acting
under color of state law, participated as mehlbers of a white moh in a race Riot that was
designed to, and did in fact, brutalize and terrorize the Airican Arnerican residents of the
Greenwood District.").
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on that score, the other barriers connected to the passage of time (reviewed above) remain and still must be surmounted. The proximate
causation problem is not a serious obstacle. This is not to say that
proximate cause issues are irrelevant-they clearly are relevant. Nevertheless, the proximate cause objections appeal to be weak.
What kind of proximate cause defense could ble asserted in the
Tulsa case? There is a basic rule from the constitutional tort cases,
similar to the general tort rule on rescue, that a government department does not have a duty to rescue a partictilar citizen from private
harm. The doctrine can be traced to DeShancy v. Win nebago County Dcpartment of Social Services, 27 in which lthe Supreme Court rejected the
constitutional tort claim brought against a county social services department for failing to intervene to protect a child from being sayagely beaten by his father.2 8 The governments in the Tulsa case could
try to cast the lawsuit as a rescue claim, and shield themselves with this
version of the no-dilty rule. Of course, this defense is preposterous.
The plaintiffs are claiming that there was a duty to prevent the harm
and to pu nish the injurers, neither of which appears to have happened.
And although I am not familiar with the case law on this issue, I would
think a police force does have a duty to prevent a highly foreseeable
crime. The old practice of southernl police forces to le "gone fishin"
at just the time that a racist mob set out to lynch someone should be
considered actionable negligence at least.
Since the identification and proximate cause questions are relatively simple and fall in favor of the plaintiffs in the Tulsa complaint,
the only remaining c1utestion is whether the claim should be barred on
prescription grounds, i.e., on the passage of relevant statutes of limitation. This is a difficult question. Onl the one hand, prescription rules
serve important purposes. They bar old claims broutght after actively
responsible actors and witnesses have moved or passed away and evidence has disappeared and grown stale. On tie other hand, this is a
case ill which plaintiffs have a credible claim that they were effectively
barred from suing for compensation within the period of the statutes
of limitation. The local police forces and courts would not have cooperated with any effort to sue for compensation ill 1921. The litigants
would have been left to the mercy of the same lynch mob that conducted the initial riot.

489 U.S. 189 (1989).
28 Id. at 201-02.

27
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Clearly there was a period, though it is difficult to say how long,
in which any claim for compensation would have been difficult to
bring and most likely unsuccessful. The Tulsa claim should not have
been barred over this period, which implies that the statutes of limitation should have been tolled. The question is whether that period
should be considered so long that a suit for compensation brought
today should not be barred by the prescription rules. The case boils
down to this simple issue. It would seem harsh for a court to deny
compensation on such a narrow ground, esjecially in view of the similarities between the Ttlsa and Tuskegee claims. Nevertheless, I am not
aware of any coturt tolling a statute of limitations because the plaintiffs
rationally discounted the likelihood of a successful suit.
As it happens, the Tulsa plaintiffs are arguing that a successful lawsuit would have been exceedingly diffictlt until the year 2001, when a
special commission formed by the state of Oklahoma presented a more
or less full account of what happened during the 1921 riot.29 This
should be viewed as an effort to fall within the "discovery" basis for tolling a statute of limitations. Under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers his injury-as in the case of a
medical malpractice victim who discovers that. a sponge has been left
inside him months after the surgeon's negligent act.30 The Tulsa plaintiffs can be understood as arguing that there was not enough information about the cause of the 1921 riot to bring a successful suit until the
publication of the 2001 report. To be sure, this is not the same as the
traditional discovery argument, but it is close.
This is a plausible justification for tolling the statute of limitations
only because of the special circumstances of the Tulsa case. Lawsuits
brought by victims soon after the riots were met with hostility in tie
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local courts and government offices and routinely were dismissed.
Official accounts of the riots were deliberately vague and obfiscated
the chain of causation and responsibility.3 2 In addition, many of the
victims eventually moved on, choosing to build their lives again in a
new environment rather than staying behind to regain what was lost.
Given the enornous cost of finding victims, persuading thiem to
29 First A nended Complaint at 18, Alexander (No. 03-CV-133). "The legislature of the
State of Oklahoma adopted many of the Commission's findings by statute in 2001." Id. at
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prosecute a claim, and proving responsibility, a highly plausible case
can be made that the Tulsa suit was not a feasible claim for a private
lmwer to pursue until the state's own investigation had set out the
facts on causation and responsibility.
If this statute of limitations question is resolved in favor of plaintiffs
in the Tulsa case, will the FleetBoston complaint appear to be stronger?
Perhaps, but the distance between the FleetBoston and Tulsa clais is considerably fiurther than that between the Tulsa and Tuskegee claims.
CONCLUSION

When thinking about reparations claims, one should avoid the
mistake of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties in
terms of identification of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In fact, reparations clainis vary along man\y legal dimensions, creating a rich array in terms of their consistency with settled
law. This paper has set out a framework for evaluating the likelihood
that these claims will prevail in court, primarily in the hope that it
might help clarify the issues in debates over the wisdom of reparations
litigation.

